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Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000100070004-8

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27 May 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

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SUBJECT: Dissemination of Non-National Intelligence to Foreign Governments

Would you please meet in my office at 10:00 A.M., 2 June, to discuss or let me know your views by telephone on the following.

1. In order to clarify problems relating to dissemination of non-national intelligence the following may be helpful:

a. The procedure for the implementation of the revision of NCID 1 with respect to the dissemination of national intelligence has been set forth in IAC-D-45/2. Proposals for new disseminations and a record of proposals cleared will be found in the IAC-D-45 series.

b. Finished intelligence produced by the Agency which does not contain a contribution from other agencies of such significance to require noting in keeping with the DCI's memorandum of 6 March 1962, TAB A, and which is not concurred in by the other agencies, is clearly non-national intelligence. It is the responsibility of the producing office to recommend to DCI that finished intelligence shall be sent to a foreign government or governments and such notification shall include a statement that any references to other agencies' estimates or intelligence have been cleared for such dissemination with the agency concerned. There shall then remain only the question of whether or not military information included in the finished intelligence is in accordance with NIC policy.

2. If the foregoing in paragraph 1.b. is correct DCI policy might be handled as follows:

a. The substantive office to indicate the presence or absence of military information along with its recommendation for dissemination of its CIA non-national finished intelligence for dissemination to a foreign government.

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b. This might then be routed to IDC to confirm the absence of military information or if it is present to concern or non-concern as whether the military information in question is within MIC policy or

c. The substantive office could make its recommendation direct to OCD which should then be able to confirm the absence of military information or if there is military information present to evaluate whether it is in keeping with MIC policy as set forth by IDC. In the event that the military information is not in keeping with MIC policy OCD could then refer the paper to IDC for handling with the substantive office.

3. In transmitting a recommendation to OCD for the dissemination of CIA intelligence to foreign governments the same requirement should be applicable that is laid down in paragraph (4)(c) of [redacted]. That paragraph reads as follows:

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"The office which prepares a finished intelligence report based upon unevaluated information from sensitive sources will edit its content in such manner as to ensure minimum danger of source disclosure. Since source may be revealed by the content of an information report, editing will go beyond the deletion of source descriptions and indications of the way in which the information was collected. In questionable or extremely sensitive cases, the producing office will consult with the collecting office prior to publication of the finished intelligence material."

JAMES Q. ASAMI  
Assistant Director  
Intelligence Coordination

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